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INTRODUCTION
THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
THE SIERRA LEONE TRIBUNAL TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Charles C. Jalloh*
First, I am grateful to the editors of the FIU Law Review for hosting this
“micro-symposium” on my new book The Legal Legacy of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone.1 In addition to publishing this “micro-issue” of the law
review, with prominent international law experts that they have invited
commenting on the book, Sofia Perla, Christina Ramsey and their colleagues
invited me to give a talk for FIU Law students in September 2020.2 Due to
the COVID-19 global health pandemic, which led to a shutdown of the
university campus, we were not able to hold the event in person. Nonetheless,
taking advantage of videoconferencing technology, we were able to meet
virtually. It was still a delight to present the book and to engage with these
bright students. Their probing questions on the book gave me much fodder
for thought. I thank them all.
Second, it is said that it is an honor to write and an even bigger honor to
be read. I feel privileged to both be able to write and even more privileged to
be read, especially by such prominent colleagues. I am therefore indebted to
the stellar lineup of scholars and practitioner colleagues who so kindly
accepted the law review’s invitation to read and engage with the ideas in my
book. Without their generosity of time and critical engagement, both this
special issue on the legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and
the online Opinio Juris book symposium, hosted by Jessica Dorsey and Kevin

*

Professor of Law at Florida International University and member, International Law
Commission. Jalloh previously served as a legal adviser in the Special Court for Sierra Leone and is the
founder of the Center for International Law and Policy in Africa based in Freetown, Sierra Leone. His
related works include, as editor, THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR
AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2015), CONSOLIDATED LEGAL
TEXTS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2007), and lead editor of THE LAW REPORTS OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (AFRC Case 2012, CDF Case 2014, Taylor Case 2016, RUF Case
2021).
1 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2020)
[hereinafter THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE].
2 Symposium, The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 15 FIU L. REV. 1 (2021),
https://law.fiu.edu/2020/09/21/fiu-law-review-micro-symposium-the-legal-legacy-of-the-special-courtfor-sierra-leone/.
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Jon Heller, in March 20213 would not have been possible. I am indebted to
both the commentators and my other academic colleagues.
In the remainder of this introduction, and for the benefit of the readers
who might not get a chance to secure a copy or to read the book, I wish to
briefly introduce the main chapters and arguments in the book. Thereafter,
the reviewer comments on the book will follow, based on the sequence of the
chapters as they have appeared in the monograph. In a final essay, at the end
of the present issue, I will respond to the main comments and few criticisms
of the book.
***
It must be common knowledge by now, at least among international
lawyers, that it was the fateful decision of the UN Security Council to
establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in 19934 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
in 19945 to prosecute atrocity crimes in the Balkans and East Africa that
rescued the idea of international criminal law (ICL). The SCSL, whose work
began in 2002 and concluded in 2013, followed in the footsteps of the ICTY
and the ICTR. The SCSL benefited from its predecessors but also introduced
a new “hybrid” model of the international criminal tribunal. An ad hoc model
that, for various reasons including its mixed subject matter jurisdiction and
local ownership, has proved to be of relevance for States as a means of
providing credible justice for international crimes, despite the initial
impression that the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court
(ICC)6 would render them superfluous.7
The significant contribution of the ICTY,8 and to a lesser extent the
ICTR,9 to the development of ICL is well known. The same is not as true of
the SCSL.10 My goal in writing this book was to shine a spotlight on this
innovative institution, as the first such court created by the UN and one of its
member states, by evaluating its main contributions to the evolution of ICL.
3
See Jessica Dorsey, Book Symposium: The Legal Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
by Charles Jalloh, OPINIOJURIS (Mar. 15, 2021), http://opiniojuris.org/2021/03/15/book-symposiumthe-legal-legacy-of-the-special-court-for-sierra-leone-by-charles-jalloh/.
4 S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
5 S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
7 Id.
8 See ICTY Symposium: Final Reflection on the ICTY, IRMCT (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.icty.org/en/features/icty-legacy-dialogues/icty-symposium-final-reflections-on-the-icty.
9 See A Compendium on the Legacy of the ICTR and the Development of International Law,
IRMCT (Nov. 8, 2014), https://unictr.irmct.org/en/compendium-legacy-ictr-and-developmentinternational-law.
10 THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, supra note 1.
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The monograph, which began life as a doctoral thesis but was subsequently
expanded with new chapters, examined what I dub the SCSL’s legal legacy.
The idea of “legacy” has been part of ICL discourse since at least the seminal
Nuremberg Trials. But, somewhat surprisingly, there is no universally
accepted meaning of the term. Even though experts in the field often
colloquially talk about the “Nuremberg Legacy.” In simple terms, as I used
the term in this book, legacy was a shorthand for the body of legal decisions
and rules that the SCSL may have left behind for current and future courts
tasked with prosecuting the same or similar international crimes.
Of course, under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice,11 judicial decisions along with the works of scholars are only
subsidiary means for determining rules of international law. But this starting
point for the sources of international law understates the significant role
judicial decisions have historically played in international law’s development
generally and international criminal law in particular. A keen observer might
also note that SCSL rulings are not binding on other courts. So, the question
for them will be, what value could one claim to come from its decisions and
rulings for other courts, especially given the decentralized nature of
international law. That, of course, would be a valid question.
Nonetheless, in the book, my point of departure is not a claim that
judicial decisions of an ad hoc court like the SCSL is equivalent to the
primary sources of international law found in treaties or customary
international law which correspond to Article 38(1)(a) and (b) of the ICJ
Statute. The claim is that formally bindingness of judicial decisions is not the
only way to assess the influence of jurisprudence especially in a decentralized
legal system like international law. Thus, one must assess the extent that the
SCSL developed persuasive legal reasoning on critical questions of broader
relevance in ICL. Where persuasive legal rulings are offered, those decisions
help to facilitate the work of other criminal tribunals and in that way
contribute to solidifying the still emerging corpus of ICL norms. If this
contention is correct, it seems natural that much of the initial influence we
can expect to find from the SCSL caselaw will be in international criminal
courts and tribunals, whether those are ad hoc or permanent, but the
jurisprudential legacy will also be felt in national, sub-regional and regional
courts addressing human rights issues or similar concerns as those that
confronted the SCSL during its existence.
In the book, though I noted essentially in passing that the SCSL was
innovative in its institutional design as well such as through the establishment

11 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945,
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute.
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of a Defense Office, I focused the book on the main SCSL judicial rulings on
several fascinating legal questions for the ICL field as a whole. These
concerned the challenge of framing the personal jurisdiction of such courts
to demarcate the types of cases suitable for prosecution at the international
instead of the national level which is an ongoing challenge for the field; the
issue of the novel forced marriage as a crime against humanity in the effort
to redress the gender imbalanced impact of atrocity crimes; how to flesh out
the elements of the newly minted crime of child recruitment as a war crime
under international law; the question of whether a sitting head of a third state
could be prosecuted by a tribunal partly created by a neighboring state in
collaboration with the UN; the status of blanket amnesties for international
crimes under international law; and finally, the relationship between truth
commissions and criminal tribunals.
I noted other interesting caselaw such as the prosecution of UN
peacekeepers for the first time, as a war crime, as well as the SCSL caselaw
on defense rights and the role of the Security Council in creating such courts.
I could not address those in the book for reasons of space. Overall, my
principal argument in the book on the main topics that are widely associated
with the SCSL is that by virtue of its jurisprudence on the above topics which
is increasingly being used by both international and regional and national
courts, from Kampala to The Hague and beyond, the SCSL has bequeathed a
vital juridical legacy to the field of ICL.
Structurally, the book is divided into eleven chapters. Chapter One
discussed the background and purpose of the book, the aims of the research
and why it is significant as well as the methodology and contribution to the
legal literature. This chapter situated the SCSL against the post-Cold War
international criminal law landscape. As I explained in greater detail in the
book, in contrast to the Chapter VII tribunals created by the UN to prosecute
crimes in the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, that landscape
was not a barren one by the time the SCSL was established in 2002. This
meant that there was already an appreciable body of caselaw and legal norms
that the SCSL could build upon to make its own unique contributions. Yet,
in doing so, the SCSL also considered several thorny legal issues that were
in some respects specific to Sierra Leone, but, perhaps even more
importantly, foreshadowed similar concerns for other conflict affected States
in Africa and elsewhere. The rulings in response to the Sierra Leone fact
pattern, which raised questions of broader systemic significance, could thus
be an informative basis for other situations where those same or similar issues
arose.
In Chapter Two of the book, which gave a brief overview of Sierra
Leone’s horrific blood diamonds driven civil war which lasted between 1991
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and 2002, I provided the context for understanding the later SCSL mandate.
Based on the findings of the SCSL and the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the leading works of Sierra Leonean
historians, I trace the origins of the conflict that nearly tore what was thought
to be the most peace-loving country in West Africa to internal and external
factors which led to a border incursion by the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) rebels from neighboring Liberia in March 1991. I show how
widespread killings by Sierra Leoneans and Liberians and other West
Africans against innocent Sierra Leoneans; rape and acts of sexual violence,
particularly against women and young girls; mass amputations; use of child
soldiers; acts of terrorism against civilians, including the burning of entire
towns and villages; and the attacks on UN peacekeepers became some of the
tragic signatures associated with the Sierra Leone conflict.
In Chapter Three, I discussed the circumstances leading up to the
establishment of the SCSL. Basically, I show how the elected Sierra Leonean
government’s push to prosecute was a result of the breakdown of a regionally
sanctioned peace agreement between the authorities and the RUF rebels
concluded at Togo in July 1999 under the auspices of the sub-regional body
known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).12
In the lead up to the ECOWAS peace negotiations, what I call a “forgive and
forget policy” had been adopted by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s
government. He deliberately sought to trade non-prosecution and conferral
of a blanket amnesty to the rebels in exchange for peace. But the generous
Lomé accord emboldened the RUF, partly because of the “bitter pill” 13 that
it contained in Article IX (Pardon and Amnesty) and the lack of good faith
on the part of the rebels, eventually led the government to reverse course and
instead request UN assistance14 to establish a credible special court to
prosecute its former enemies and their collaborators. This represented a shift
to a new policy of “prosecute and punish.”
This part of the book highlights the dilemmas that the Sierra Leonean
leaders faced, and, noting that this same concern had arisen in other contexts
of transitional justice, I wondered whether policy discretion including the
amnesty carrot may sometimes be needed to end atrocities in otherwise
12 U.N. Security Council, Letter Dated 12 July 1999 from the Chargé D’Affaires Ad Interim of
the Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/777 (July 12, 1999).
13 President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Statement by His Excellency made before the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (Aug. 5, 2003), http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah080503.html.
14 U.N. Security Council, Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra
Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786
(Aug. 10, 2000), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Establishment/S-2000-786.pdf.
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unwinnable civil wars. This, of course, is the famous peace versus justice or
peace and justice question. Its broader relevance, beyond Sierra Leone, is
self-evident and in fact also a sensitive topic for many other conflicts around
the world. The same issue has already negatively affected the narrative about
the ICC’s work in Africa with some especially in the African political elite
claiming that the global penal court has become an obstacle to peace in places
like Sudan, Kenya and Uganda because of the ICC’s dogged insistence on
prosecutions.15 The argument, being a caricature of a more complex set of
circumstances involving considerable governmental elite self-interest, ought
to be taken seriously where merited but also with a grain of salt where it is
often a fig leaf for inaction or considerable self-dealing.
Having set the war and the creation of the tribunal in context, Chapter
Four of the book turned to the SCSL’s more technical aspects in terms of its
jurisdiction, organization, and trials. I critically evaluated the competence or
jurisdiction of the SCSL over persons, the mix of international and Sierra
Leonean crimes that it could prosecute, the geographic territory over which
it could exercise its authority, as well as its limited temporal jurisdiction that
started at roughly the half-way point of the war rather than its beginning. I
show that, despite the perhaps understandable high expectations amongst
Sierra Leoneans and their government that the UN’s involvement in
establishing the SCSL would lead to the prosecutions of hundreds of
perpetrators, the SCSL was only actually designed to carry out only a small
set of trials over a short three-year period. This decision was driven by cost
concerns, especially in the halls of the UN. The funding fatigue affected the
design of all aspects of the institution, including its extremely limited
personal jurisdiction to persons bearing greatest responsibility and unstable
donations-based funding system which the UN Secretary-General protested
to no avail.
In the end, although the work of the tribunal lasted for eleven years and
it successfully concluded only nine cases (i.e., the AFRC joinder of three
cases, CDF [2 cases] and RUF [three] plus that of former Liberian president
Charles Taylor), its task from the beginning was to deliver symbolic justice
to a handful of persons deemed most responsible for the war crimes, crimes
against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law carried out during the second half of the “dirty war in West Africa.”16
In Chapter Five, since this form of ratione personae jurisdiction was
novel, I evaluated the SCSL’s key contributions in relation to its personal
15 Charles C. Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 445
(2009); THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA (Charles Chernor Jalloh & Ilias Bantekas
eds., 2017).
16 LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA (2005).
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jurisdiction over persons “bearing greatest responsibility.” This way of
framing personal jurisdiction was first introduced to international law by
Article 1 of the SCSL Statute.17 Before that, all the tribunals since the
Nuremberg Trials had been conferred jurisdiction in a much broader way
over “persons responsible.” Since the SCSL Statute was adopted, the
“greatest responsibility” lexicon appears to have become a sort of darling
phrase for the expression of personal jurisdiction in relation to international
penal courts. The popularity of the notion seems partly explained by the
simply catchy nature of the idea that it expresses, which is that the reach of
modern international criminal tribunals must be carefully limited since the
bulk of prosecutions for atrocity crimes ought to take place at the national
instead of the international level. This phrase has thus been warmly embraced
by prosecutors and judges of the ICC, whose use of it in contrast to their
SCSL counterparts, reflects policy positions rather than a formal legal
requirement of the ICC Statute.18
A key argument of this chapter is that the attraction of greatest
responsibility jurisdiction represented a subtle shift towards lowered
expectations of the number of atrocity prosecutions that can be expected from
international courts. A more positive way of viewing this jurisdictional
framing is that it represents a more realistic framing of the limited reach of
international penal tribunals which are ultimately supplements, not
replacements, for the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts. The problem,
of course, is that while there is considerable political rhetoric including by
the ICC’s 123 States Parties calling for an end to impunity, the number of
national prosecutions of atrocity crimes are not matched by the rhetoric. The
reality is more complex and reveals a relatively small number of
prosecutions, and despite the apparent fatigue with international prosecutions
and their expense, they often are the only means to achieve any type of justice
for victims.
In any case, despite the initial almost vehement disagreement amongst
the SCSL judges regarding the best way to construe the novel “greatest
responsibility personal jurisdiction,” that is to say whether as a form of
guideline for the prosecution or as a jurisdictional threshold that they must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt, the rulings of the SCSL in the AFRC
and the CDF cases on this issue advanced a useful understanding of this form
of narrow personal jurisdiction in ICL. The SCSL judges, despite repeated
defense challenges, concluded that “greatest responsibility” was merely a

17 S.C. Res. 1315, art. 1, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Aug. 14, 2000) [hereinafter
SCSL Statute].
18 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
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form of prosecutorial guidance instead of a jurisdictional requirement
forming part of the element of the crime. In addition, as regards the secondary
questions it raised as to who fell within its ambit, the phrase was found to be
sufficiently broad to encompass both what I call “killer-perpetrators” as well
as those in the “political-military leaders” category. The chapter
demonstrates the influence of the SCSL rulings on the work of other courts,
with similar limited mandates, especially the Cambodia Tribunal19 for
instance in the Duch Case.20
The treatment of gendered crimes continues to be a challenge for
international criminal courts, which have been sometimes criticized for their
general indifference to the plight of women and girls who so often bear the
devastating brunt of sexual violence in armed conflicts. The latter was true in
the Sierra Leone civil war as well. In Chapter Six, I discussed the SCSL’s
landmark contribution to the law of crimes against humanity, focusing in
particular, on the novel crime against humanity of forced marriage as part of
the residual category of “other inhumane acts.” The efforts to investigate,
charge and prosecute such bad conduct associated with the Sierra Leone
conflict were undoubtedly laudable. The prosecutors also charged the crimes
of rape and sexual slavery. They went even further, deliberately seeking to
repair a blind spot in the law by capturing conduct that was so egregious that
it warranted the introduction of a new crime against humanity into the ICL
lexicon. The new crime, proposed by prosecutors through amended
indictments eventually endorsed by the SCSL judges in the AFRC21 and
RUF22 but not CDF23 Cases symbolically acknowledged the disproportionate
gendered burden of the Sierra Leone war on women and girls. But this
expressive goal took place against the backdrop of the countervailing concern
to ensure that the fair trial rights of the suspects are respected and the debate
amongst the judges whether recognition of a new crime was actually
warranted. The significant impact of the SCSL rulings on forced marriage
and the law of crimes against humanity is illustrated by the ICC Trial
Chamber’s recognition of forced marriage as a crime under Article 7(1)(k) of
the Rome Statute in its February 2021 Ongwen Trial Judgment.24 This point
perhaps demonstrates, more than any other, that it is not so much the

19 Extraordinary
Chambers
in
the
Courts
of
Cambodia,
ECCC,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/node/39457 (last visited May 30, 2021).
20 Prosecutor v. Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment, paras. 62−74 (Feb.
3, 2012).
21 Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008).
22 Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009).
23 Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment (May 28, 2008).
24 Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment (Feb. 4, 2021).
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bindingness of a court’s ruling in a decentralized hierarchy of courts where
stare decisis is unknown but rather the possibility of prosecutorial and
judicial creativity and innovation that can provide significant influence in
developing the existing law.
In Chapter Seven, I turned to the war crime prohibiting the recruitment
and use of children under the age of fifteen for the purposes of using them to
participate actively in hostilities in Article 4(c) of the SCSL Statute.25 The
prosecution of this crime in Freetown, similar to one that was first included
in Article 8(2)(e)(vii) and b(xxvi) of the ICC Statute,26 gained in global
importance for two reasons. First, upon invocation by the SCSL prosecutors
against several accused persons in the trials, it became the first of such
prosecutions in international law. The inclusion of the crime in the SCSL
Statute reflected the evident reality that the Sierra Leone war was fought with
a significant participation by underaged youth. Second, and as a
consequence, it meant the SCSL judges became the first to flesh out the
elements of this crime to a concrete set of cases. This enabled them to
influence the subsequent development of the ICC case law. This seemed
fortuitous because the maiden ICC case, The Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga,27 relied solely on war crime of child recruitment charges as the
basis for the indictment.28 I argue that, though not perfect, the SCSL’s
celebrated ruling that child recruitment constituted a crime under customary
international law by November 1996, which ruling has been widely embraced
by courts and commentators, constitutes a useful contribution to international
law. It has helped clear the path for the use of this post-1998 crime in the ICC
and opened the way for further development of a customary law crime that
can be used to justify prosecutions for such heinous and unconscionable
behaviors on other contexts around the world.
Today, moving on from the SCSL’s jurisprudential impact on the
development or application of new crimes, in the field of international law,
the issue of immunities from prosecution for sitting heads of state remains
sensitive. At the international tribunal level, since at least World War II, we
have seen an erosion of the absolute rule of immunity which basically
rendered leaders untouchable in relation to criminal proceedings. By the late
1940s, the International Law Commission could craft Nuremberg Principle
III to the effect that [t]he fact that a person who committed an act which
constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or
25

SCSL Statute, supra note 17, at art. 4.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
27 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment (Dec. 1, 2014).
28 See generally Diane Marie Amann, International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 106 AM.
J. INT’L L. 809 (2012).
26
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responsible government official does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law. The General Assembly had endorsed that same
principle, which many now consider to be part of customary international
law. Now, while virtually all international courts established by the UN has
applied this principle since 1993, some sovereigns accused of international
crimes by international or internationalized courts have occasionally sought
to contest it drawing upon classical international law principles that predated
the historic Nuremberg trials and judgment.
The problem is that because of their nature, immunities raise critical
questions for international law and the ideal of equality of all persons before
ICL. The problem is compounded since removals of immunities are often
read or painted as pushback to age old notions of sovereignty, which
ordinarily limit the possibility of assertion of criminal jurisdiction by the
courts of one state over the officials of another state, largely for the sake of
maintaining serene international relations. The stability of international
relations is not something to be taken for granted. History shows many wars
in history where the strong States do what they wish in terms of use of force,
with devastating consequences, and the weaker ones suffer what they must.
At the same time, after World War II offered an opportunity to move the
needle from State centric security to human security, taking as a point of
departure that the preservation of human beings are also legitimate
preoccupations even of sovereign States. Thus, as I have often pointed out
during plenary debates on immunity and crimes against humanity in the
International Law Commission, the challenge today is how international law
can better balance the imperatives of sovereignty and the fight against
impunity.
I analyze the SCSL’s treatment of head of state immunity in Chapter
Eight of the book. The SCSL’s trial of former Liberian president Charles
Taylor, who was indicted by the SCSL while an incumbent, grounds the
discussion of the appeals chamber’s conclusion29 that he was not entitled to
any immunity from prosecution before the SCSL in light of the ICJ’s ruling
on customary international law immunities in the Arrest Warrant Case.30
Essentially, the SCSL Appeals Chamber held that Taylor’s personal
immunity was irrelevant to proceedings carried out by an international penal
court established with the support of the international community.31 I argue
29 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May
31, 2004).
30 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14, 2002).
31 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May
31, 2004).
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that, though sometimes criticized by some commentators, the core added
value of the Taylor immunity decision seems to have been largely
overlooked. I emphasize the SCSL’s judicial finding concerning the rationale
for immunity, which is relevant for the maintenance of serene relations
between co-equal sovereigns at the horizontal level but was adjudged of little
assistance in vertical relationships between international criminal courts and
States.
The fact that Taylor’s immunity was deemed unavailable, in the context
of an international criminal court established partly by the UN and partly by
Sierra Leone at the vertical level, differs from the horizontal level of co-equal
sovereigns in that international community involvement offers the vital
safeguards to constrain problematic unilateral actions by the courts of one
state (Sierra Leone) against the leader of another state (Liberia). That is not
to say that a handful of States can come together to establish a tribunal via
treaty simply as a way to get around the immunity of the leader of a third
state which may be applicable at the horizontal level. To allow that could
prove problematic, and depending on the context, could even give rise to a
return to the law of the jungle where might makes right.
But that is not what happened at the SCSL. If I am right, in the Taylor
scenario, an additional point of distinction is that while the treaty that
established the SCSL is between the UN and Sierra Leone only, the consent
of Liberia is not necessarily required for the removal of the immunity of its
head of state. This is because, as a UN member state, it arguably already
indirectly consented to the UN Security Council decisions taken under
Chapter VI and Chapter VII to address the conflict in both countries as a way
of maintaining or restoring international peace and security in West Africa.
In any case, Liberia later on expressly consented to the request for Taylor’s
arrest and transfer to the SCSL for trial, implicitly waiving his immunity as
the holder of the immunity. This cured any presumed defects in relation to
Taylor’s immunity. The ICC pre-trial and trial chambers, which has faced
some challenges concerning its rulings on requests for States Parties to arrest
high level suspects including heads of state holding immunity, seems to have
benefited from the SCSL Taylor precedent in several cases involving
Malawi,32 Chad,33 and in May 2019, by the ICC Appeals Chamber Al Bashir

32 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome
Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the
Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 12, 2011).
33 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome
Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the
Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011).
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decision.34 The same can be said of the impact of the Taylor precedent in
other settings, for example, in the debates of the International Law
Commission where it has been invoked frequently in the reports of special
rapporteurs and debates on questions of international criminal law.
In Chapter Nine, I turned to another celebrated SCSL ruling. This
concerned Sierra Leone’s initial conferral of a blanket amnesty on all the
combatants that perpetrated international crimes during the war, and the
ensuing legal debate whether the subsequent unilateral withdrawal of that
amnesty, barred the prosecutions by the SCSL. In the main, I argued that the
SCSL judges reached the right result on the amnesty issue but that their legal
reasoning was perhaps too convoluted in answering the question presented.
Even though the SCSL conceded that the use of conditional amnesties as a
way of settling bitter conflicts is not per se prohibited, the amnesty ruling
also suggested that blanket amnesties may be different and that a norm
against amnesties for serious crimes under international law may be
crystallizing. In any case, the Sierra Leonean government’s conferral of
amnesty for all crimes is not necessarily binding on other sovereigns. Other
States would continue to retain jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the
offenders, for international crimes, should they wish to do so. Similarly, such
amnesties could not bar subsequent criminal prosecutions for international
crimes before a separate international tribunal such as the SCSL. Though I
was perhaps rather critical of aspects of the decisions, in the end, I did
conclude that the SCSL rulings on amnesty now constitute a significant part
of its widely cited caselaw on the question of amnesties by national, regional,
and international courts, including in recent ICC decisions concerning Libya.

34 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir
Appeal (May 6, 2019). The present author was involved as one of two external counsel for the AU
Commission as intervener in the Al Bashir case, the judgment on which has been met with both scholarly
support, see e.g., CLAUS KREß, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE ICC APPEALS CHAMBER’S
JUDGMENT OF 6 MAY 2019 IN THE JORDAN REFERRAL RE AL-BASHIR APPEAL (2019),
https://www.toaep.org/ops-pdf/8-kress; Leila Sadat, Why the ICC’s Judgment in the al-Bashir Case
Wasn’t So Surprising, JUST SECURITY (July 12, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64896/why-the-iccsjudgment-in-the-al-bashir-case-wasnt-so-surprising/; Adil Ahmad Haque, Head of State Immunity Is Too
Important for the International Court of Justice, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/68801/head-of-state-immunity-is-too-important-for-the-international-courtof-justice/, and criticism, see e.g., Dapo Akande, ICC Appeals Chamber Holds that Heads of State Have
No Immunity Under Customary International Law Before International Tribunals, EJIL:TALK! BLOG
EUR. J. INT’L L. (May 6, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-that-heads-of-statehave-no-immunity-under-customary-international-law-before-international-tribunals/; Kevin Jon Heller,
A Thought Experiment About Complementarity and the Jordan Appeal Decision, OPINIOJURIS (May 9,
2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/09/a-thought-experiment-about-complementarity-and-the-jordanappeal-decision/; Asad Kiyani, Elisions and Omissions: Questioning the ICC’s Latest Bashir Immunity
Ruling, JUST SECURITY (May 8, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63973/elisions-and-omissionsquestioning-the-iccs-latest-bashir-immunity-ruling/.
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It therefore represents a valuable contribution of the tribunal to the
development of international law.
Turning to the potentially tenuous interaction between, on the one hand,
truth and reconciliation commissions, and on the other hand special criminal
courts, those being traditionally seen as alternatives to each other, I argue in
Chapter Ten of the book that the SCSL caselaw adds considerably to our
understanding of the challenges that arise in transitional situations where both
of these types of mechanisms are deployed simultaneously. Indeed, I
discussed the SCSL trials against the backdrop of its concurrent operation,
for a period of eighteen months, with the Sierra Leone TRC. That case study
suggests a range of practical issues that will arise. I note that, to avoid future
problems in other contexts, it would be better to clarify up front how such
institutions with inherently tense mandates must relate to each other
whenever used simultaneously. This clarity should ideally come from the
founders, during their establishment of the two separate mechanisms, but
failing that, through the early conclusion of an agreed framework between
the two institutions. The lesson of Sierra Leone has been relevant for
accountability discussions in the Gambia, and South Sudan, and will be
useful for Kosovo and the Central African Republic.
Finally, in Chapter Eleven, I summarized the main conclusions derived
from the analysis in the book. On the whole, while conceding that its
jurisprudence was sometimes not as well reasoned as it could have been given
the tendency to sometimes simplify complex questions, on balance, the
SCSL’s judicial rulings on often complicated issues of international law
made some important judicial contributions to the development of the nascent
field of ICL. Already, the impact of the tribunal’s jurisprudence has resonated
well beyond the confines of Sierra Leone and Africa. Indeed, the SCSL
caselaw is already proving helpful for the work of other national and
international courts. In a way, by its valiant efforts to resolve some thorny
issues it had before it, the SCSL also gave back to the international
community through its key contributions on greatest responsibility personal
jurisdiction, forced marriage as a crime against humanity, the war crime of
child recruitment, head of state immunity, amnesties and the relationship
between special courts and truth commissions. Based on the evidence, so far,
the SCSL legacy on these topics will continue to be of great relevance to the
international legal community. That, in my view, can legitimately be called
the Freetown Legacy.

